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Adaptive behavior requires the ability to flexibly control actions. This can occur either
proactively to anticipate task requirements, or reactively in response to sudden changes.
Recent work in humans has identified a network of cortical and subcortical brain region
that might have an important role in proactive and reactive control. However, due to
technical limitations, such as the spatial and temporal resolution of the BOLD signal,
human imaging experiments are not able to disambiguate the specific function(s) of
these brain regions. These limitations can be overcome through single-unit recordings in
non-human primates. In this article, we describe the behavioral and physiological evidence
for dual mechanisms of control in response inhibition in the medial frontal cortex of
monkeys performing the stop signal or countermanding task.
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INTRODUCTION
Adaptive behavior requires the ability to flexibly control actions.
This can occur either proactively to anticipate task requirements,
or reactively in response to sudden changes. The stop-signal,
or countermanding, task is a commonly used behavioral task
that requires both forms of behavioral control. It is, therefore,
uniquely suited to study the neuronal mechanism of proactive
and reactive control.
Recent neuroimaging studies of humans in the stop signal task
usingmanual and eyemovements show activation centered on the
medial and lateral frontal cortex and subthalamic nucleus (STN;
Curtis et al., 2005; Aron and Poldrack, 2006; Li et al., 2006; Aron
et al., 2007a). These human imaging results have emphasized crit-
ical roles of the supplementary motor cortex (preSMA/SMA),
right inferior frontal cortex (IFC), and the STN in response inhi-
bition during a manual stop signal task (reviewed by Aron, 2011).
Reactive stopping depends on a fronto-basal ganglia network
which includes the preSMA, the IFC, the basal ganglia, and M1.
Specifically, it has been suggested that the fast inhibition of a pre-
pared response requires activity of the IFC (Aron et al., 2003).
The exact role of the IFC within the proactive inhibition process
is debated and may involve the attentional detection of the stop
signal and/or a direct role in inhibitory control. Furthermore, it
has been suggested that the inhibitory control may be instantiated
via hyperdirect input to the basal ganglia via the STN (Aron and
Poldrack, 2006). Proactive control also depends on a fronto-basal
ganglia network which includes premotor cortex (e.g., preSMA),
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, striatum, and palladium. In this
context, inhibitory control may be instantiated via the indirect
pathway.
This recent work in humans has identified a network of cor-
tical and subcortical brain region that might have an important
role in proactive and reactive control. However, due to tech-
nical limitations, such as the spatial and temporal resolution
of the BOLD signal, fMRI experiments are not able to disam-
biguate the specific function(s) of these brain regions. In an
ongoing research project we and other labs have, therefore, inves-
tigated the role of these frontal areas in behavioral control using
single-unit and local field potential recordings in awake, behav-
ing primates performing a countermanding task. In the following
we will review some of the insights into the neuronal mechanisms
underlying proactive and reactive control that this research has
provided.
PROACTIVE AND REACTIVE CONTROL
Braver (2007, 2012) proposed the dual mechanisms of control
framework which states that cognitive control operates via two
distinct operating modes: proactive control and reactive con-
trol. Proactive control is a form of early selection in which
goal-relevant information is actively maintained in a sustained
manner, before the occurrence of cognitively demanding events,
to optimally bias attention, perception, and action systems in a
goal-driven manner (Miller and Cohen, 2001). Reactive control
is recruited as a late correction mechanism that is mobilized only
as needed, in a just-in-time manner, such as after a high inter-
ference event is detected (Jacoby et al., 1999). Thus, proactive
control relies upon the anticipation and prevention of interfer-
ence before it occurs, whereas reactive control relies upon the
detection and resolution of interference after its onset. Although
substantial theoretical and experimental progress toward eluci-
dating the mechanisms underlying reactive inhibitory control has
beenmade (see for example reviews by Stuphorn and Schall, 2002;
Schall and Boucher, 2007), the mechanisms underlying proactive
control have remained less clear.
THE STOP SIGNAL TASK
The stop signal or countermanding paradigm (Figure 1) has been
used to investigate the neural control of movement initiation and
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FIGURE 1 | The arm countermanding task. Each trial begins when the
cursor is positioned inside the center box. After a delay, the target box
appears to one side of the screen and the center box disappears,
instructing the monkey to move the cursor into the target box. On stop
signal trials, the center box reappears after the SSD signaling that the
monkey should cancel the planned movement. On the variable-reward
version of the paradigm, the color of the center box indicates whether the
trial will result in a high or low reward if performed correctly.
inhibition in rats, awake behaving monkeys, and human sub-
jects (reviewed by Schall and Boucher, 2007). The stop signal
paradigm, which includes both a task design and a theoreti-
cal construct, was developed to investigate the control of action
(reviewed by Logan, 1994). The stop signal paradigm has also
been used to examine inhibitory control in a variety of other
contexts (reviewed by Verbruggen and Logan, 2008). The stop
signal task has also been used to examine patients with ADHD
(reviewed by Alderson et al., 2007) and, recently, has been
selected for translation for use in clinical trials (Carter et al.,
2009).
Although many variations in the stimuli and effectors have
been used in the stop signal task, the requirements of the task
are quite simple. The stop-signal task probes the ability to con-
trol action by requiring subjects to inhibit a planned movement
in response to an infrequent stop signal which they do with vari-
able success depending on the delay of the stop signal. Stop signal
task performance can be accounted by a race between a process
that initiates the movement (GO process) and by one that inhibits
the movement (STOP process). This race model provides an esti-
mate of the stop signal reaction time (SSRT), which is the time
required to inhibit the planned movement. The SSRT can be esti-
mated using various methods (reviewed by Logan, 1994; Band
et al., 2003). T measured in the saccade SSRT average is approx-
imately 100ms in monkeys and 130ms in humans (e.g., Hanes
and Schall, 1995; Hanes and Carpenter, 1999). In the manual
stop signal task, the SSRT is an average of 150ms in monkeys
and 250ms in humans (e.g., Boucher et al., 2007; Scangos and
Stuphorn, 2010).
The rationale and approach for the race model analysis of
the neural stop signal data has been described previously (Logan
et al., 1984; Hanes et al., 1998; Hanes and Schall, 1995). Briefly,
the chief virtue of the stop signal paradigm is that one can
determine whether a neural or motor related signal [e.g., single-
units, local field potentials (LFPs), evoked-potentials (ERPs),
electromyograms (EMGs)] is sufficient to control the initiation
of movements. The race model imposes two criteria that a sig-
nal must meet to play a direct role in the control of movement.
First, the signal must be different when a movement is initiated
versus when it is inhibited. Second and most important, this dif-
ference in activity must evolve before the SSRT elapses. Signals
sufficient to control movement initiation are reactive control sig-
nals that are exerted in response to the sudden occurrence of a
stop signal.
The race model assumes that the GO and STOP processes
are stationary stochastic processes with independence between
trials. In other words, the response time on the current trial
is independent of the preceding trial. However, response times
are often non-stationary and non-independent (e.g., Gilden,
2001; Wagenmakers et al., 2004). For example, it is commonly
observed across experimental conditions and response modal-
ities that subjects’response times tend to increase in the con-
text of the stop signal task relative to that in simple response
time tasks (e.g., Logan, 1981; Logan and Burkell, 1986; van den
Wildenberg et al., 2003; Mirabella et al., 2006). Specifically, both
short-term and long-term changes in stop-signal frequency lead
to behavioral adjustments (Emeric et al., 2007; Nelson et al.,
2010). For example, response times decrease after no stop signal
trials and increases after stop signal trials. Furthermore, sub-
jects’ response times increase and the probability of a cancelled
response increases with increasing global proportion of stop sig-
nal trials. It seems clear that when stop signal trials occur, subjects
proactively adopt a more cautious strategy by slowing responses
on subsequent trials.
Importantly, the stop signal task evokes both reactive and
proactive forms of control. Although the Braver et al. (2007),
Braver (2012) account of control is couched in terms of atten-
tional processes, it can be used as a working hypothesis for
investigating the proactive and reactive control processes involved
in inhibition. The dual mechanisms of control account provide
strong predictions about the temporal dynamics of brain activ-
ity related to proactive versus reactive control. Proactive control
should be associated with sustained and/or anticipatory activa-
tion, which reflects the active maintenance of task goals. This
activity may serve as a source of top-down bias that can facili-
tate processing of expected upcoming events. By contrast, reactive
control should be reflected in transient activation subsequent to
unexpected events.
NEURAL NETWORK UNDERLYING BEHAVIORAL CONTROL
A network of brain areas in the frontal cortex and the basal
ganglia have been implicated in playing a key role in behav-
ioral control (Floden and Stuss, 2006; Aron et al., 2007b; Picton
et al., 2007) and specifically during the stop signal paradigm
(Curtis et al., 2005; Aron and Poldrack, 2006; Li et al., 2006;
Aron et al., 2007a). A critical component of this network is the
medial frontal cortex, in particular the supplementary eye field
(SEF), pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA), and adjacent
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supplementary motor area (SMA). The SEF is involved in the
control of eye movements and provides input to ocular motor
structures in the striatum, SC, and brainstem (Huerta and Kaas,
1990). In contrast, the SMA is more important for the control of
skeletomotor movements, such as movements of the arm and the
hand (Fujii et al., 2002). The role of the pre-SMA is more debated,
but seems to be more cognitive than the one of the other two and
less clearly related to only one major motor system (Sumner et al.,
2007). The pre-SMA and SMA, which are reciprocally connected,
differ in their connectivity, with pre-SMA connected to prefrontal
cortex but not motor regions, and SMA to motor regions but not
prefrontal cortex (Luppino et al., 1991; Tanji, 1996; Johansen-
Berg et al., 2004). The SEF, pre-SMA, and SMA also provide
input to the striatum and STN (Alexander and Crutcher, 1990;
Alexander et al., 1990; Nambu et al., 1996). The physiology of the
medial frontal areas, as well as the one of other cortical and sub-
cortical regions has been examined for signals sufficient to control
movements in monkeys performing the saccade stop signal task
(Hanes et al., 1998; Stuphorn et al., 2000, 2010; Paré and Hanes,
2003; Emeric et al., 2008, 2010; Godlove et al., 2011) and skeleto-
motor (Chen et al., 2010; Scangos and Stuphorn, 2010) stop signal
tasks.
REACTIVE CONTROL AND PRIMARY MOTOR AREAS
In the context of the stop signal task, reactive control is recruited
as a late correction mechanism that is mobilized only as needed,
in a just-in-time manner, such as the instant a stop signal is
perceived. Because this control mechanism is engaged only at
short notice, it requires the ability to generate control signals at
high speed that are capable of influencing ongoing motor activ-
ity even at a late stage of the movement preparation. This form
of behavioral control is therefore, likely to be found within and
interacting with the primary motor systems that directly con-
trol the relevant effectors. Most of the neurophysiological work
that has investigated reactive control in monkeys has been con-
centrated on the oculomotor system, due to the fact that this
is the currently best understood motor system (Hanes et al.,
1998; Stuphorn et al., 2000; Ito et al., 2003; Paré and Hanes,
2003; but see Scangos and Stuphorn, 2010; Mirabella et al.,
2012).
The FEF, located in the rostral bank of the arcuate sulcus in
macaque monkeys, participates in the transformation of visual
signals into saccade motor commands (reviewed by Schall, 1997).
Two of the functional subpopulations of neurons that have been
observed in the FEF during gaze shifts are movement and fixa-
tion neurons. Movement neurons in the FEF exhibit increased
discharge before and during saccades (Goldberg, 1985; Schall,
1991a; Hanes and Schall, 1996) while fixation neurons are active
during fixation and exhibit decreased discharge preceding sac-
cades (Hanes et al., 1998; Sommer andWurtz, 2000). FEF neurons
innervate the superior colliculus (Segraves and Goldberg, 1987;
Sommer andWurtz, 2000) and the neural circuit in the brainstem
that generates saccades (Segraves, 1992).
Hanes et al. (1998), the first study to apply the race model to
single-unit activity during the saccade stop signal task, examined
the sufficiency of FEF neurons to control the initiation of saccadic
eye movements. Applying the race model to neuronal activity
acquired in the context of the stop signal task, provided clear
evidence that movement and fixation neurons in FEF generate
signals sufficient to control the production of gaze shifts. Saccades
were initiated if and only if the activity of FEFmovement neurons
reach a specific and constant threshold activation level which
is independent to the response time (Hanes and Schall, 1996;
Brown et al., 2008). Movement neurons, whose activity increased
as saccades were prepared, decayed in response to the stop sig-
nal before the SSRT elapsed. Fixation cells that decreased firing
before saccades exhibited elevated activity in response to the stop
signal before the SSRT elapsed. Themajority of visual neurons, on
the other hand, did not discharge differently when saccades were
initiated versus inhibited. The visual neurons that did discharge
differentially when saccades were initiated versus inhibited, did so
well after the SSRT had elapsed. Paré and Hanes (2003) observed
parallel results for visual, movement, and fixation neurons in the
superior colliculus (SC).
REACTIVE CONTROL AND MEDIAL FRONTAL CORTEX
Thus, at least one form of reactive control signals in the oculomo-
tor system is the reactivation of fixation neurons in the FEF and
SC.What is driving the onset of these neurons? At least one source
is an external event, the onset of the stop signal. Its potency in the
oculomotor stop signal task was probably due to the fact that it
was a flash of a light in the fovea, which directly activated the gaze
fixation system (Everling et al., 1998). However, there are likely to
be other, more complex, driving factors. For example, the mon-
keys initially did not respond to reappearance of the fixation light,
or at least not necessarily by inhibition of saccade preparation.
This response, and presumably the sensitivity of fixation cells to
specific sensory stimuli, was acquired during training. Likewise,
even after training, the monkeys did not show saccade inhibition,
when outside of the task setting or at the end of the recording
session, when their motivation was low. Thus, there is clearly a
task set that the monkeys learn during training and that guides
their behavior in the stop signal task, when they know that there
is a relationship between receiving reward and following certain
behavioral rules, i.e., the task set. The representation of task set
is a primary function of frontal cortex (Sakai, 2008). We decided,
therefore, to study neurons in frontal regions that were hierar-
chically higher than the primary motor areas and provided input
into FEF and SC. The first of the candidate regions that was tested
was SEF.
The SEF is an area on the dorsomedial convexivity of the
frontal cortex that seems to parallel the FEF in many ways. The
activity of neurons in the SEF are modulated by visual or audi-
tory stimuli, while other SEF neurons are modulated preceding
and during saccades (e.g., Schall, 1991b; Schlag and Schlag-Rey,
1987. Stuphorn et al. (2000, 2010) examined single-unit activity
during the saccade stop signal task to determine the sufficiency of
SEF neurons to control the initiation of saccadic eye movements.
Like the FEF movement neurons, the activity of SEF movement
neurons increased as saccades were prepared. However, unlike
their counterparts in the FEF, these neurons do not exhibit a
reliable threshold and vanishingly few neurons in the SEF gen-
erate signals that are sufficient to control gaze (Stuphorn et al.,
2000, 2010). Emeric et al. (2010) observed parallel results in the
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event related local field potentials. Importantly, in the current
context, no neurons were observed that showed enhanced activ-
ity on trial were the monkey successfully cancelled the saccade
generation. Thus, SEF does not seem to carry reactive control
signals.
Recently, we used the stop signal task to investigate the con-
trol of armmovements (Chen et al., 2010; Scangos and Stuphorn,
2010). There are important differences between these two motor
systems. For example, unlike saccades, arm movements can be
stopped at any point along their path (De Jong et al., 1990). This
non-ballistic nature of the arm movements result in differences
in the nature of the control signals required compared to the
oculomotor system.
Another reason to study SMA and pre-SMA is that they are
widely considered to play a completely different role in motor
control, than behavioral control. Specifically, it is hypothesized
that SMA and pre-SMA are primarily responsible for voluntary
movement initiation (Eccles, 1982; Goldberg, 1985; Sumner et al.,
2007; Haggard, 2008). This hypothesis was first formulated after
the discovery of the readiness potential (RP), a slow negative
scalp potential that precedes self-initiated movements in humans
(Kornhuber and Deecke, 1965) and whose source has been local-
ized to the pre-SMA (Lang et al., 1991; Ikeda et al., 1999; Yazawa
et al., 2000). Single-unit recordings in monkeys have shown that
the pre-SMA and SMA contain long-lead neurons that become
active up to 2 s before the initiation of self-paced movements
(Okano and Tanji, 1987) and that pre-SMA neurons signal the
initiation of action in a time-selective manner (Mita et al., 2009).
In addition, lesion studies indicate an important role of SMA
in inhibition, as well (Sumner et al., 2007). Thus, there are at
least two different hypotheses in the literature concerning the role
of pre-SMA and SMA in motor control. The experiments men-
tioned above have demonstrated that the earliest activity related
to movements arises in the pre-SMA and SMA, but does this
activity play a causal role in movement initiation or is this activity
related to reactive or proactive control?
Scangos and Stuphorn (2010) probed SMA and pre-SMA
movement related neurons with a manual version of the stop
signal paradigm and vanishingly few neurons provided signals
sufficient to control movement initiation according to the logic of
the stop signal paradigm (Figure 2A). However, a second group
of neurons, similar to the FEF/SC fixation neurons, were more
active during successful response inhibition. A minority of these
cells responded early enough to be able to influence the inhibition
of the movement (Figure 2B). Thus, a minority of SMA/pre-
SMA neurons may play a role in movement inhibition but do not
appear to control movement initiation.
Chen et al. (2010) examined the local field potentials that were
acquired simultaneously with the SMA single-units for signals
sufficient to control the initiation of arm movements. Unlike the
single-units, there were significant differences in LFP power in a
number of frequency bands, which correlated with the success-
ful inhibition of the arm movement. In the beta band (5–20Hz)
there was an increase in power evoked by the stop signal which
persisted long after the SSRT elapsed. Within the high gamma
band (130–140Hz), especially for planned contralateral move-
ments, there was an increase of power immediately after the
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FIGURE 2 | Movement and inhibition related activity on canceled trials.
The first dotted line represents the SSD. The second dashed line
represents the SSRT. (A) Activity from a pre-SMA cell showing a difference
in activity on latency-matched no-stop signal and canceled trials for the first
SSD for movements to the right and left. Inhibition time occurs after the
SSRT boundary for both plots. (B) SMA cell with a possible role in stopping
movement. The arrowheads mark the average time of movement start and
end. The range is indicated by the gray bar. The red and black boxes above
each plot indicate the type of trial, the target location, and the movement
direction (for no-stop signal trials).
stop signal and before the SSRT. Importantly, the modulation of
LFP power in both recordings clearly started before the SSRT.
This indicates that the neuronal processes that underlie the
changes in LFP power in the respective parts of pre-SMA and
SMA were sufficient to reactively control the inhibition of arm
movements.
The evidence we have discussed thus far suggests that, of all
the brain areas probed with the stop signal paradigm, only the
neurons in the FEF, SC, and pre-SMA/SMA carry signals suf-
ficient to control movement initiation and thus provide signals
consistent with reactive control. These findings show a poten-
tial functional difference between the control of the oculomotor
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system (through SEF) and control of the skeletomotor system
(through pre-SMA/SMA). In the oculomotor system reactive
control signals are found on the level of the primary motor areas,
but not in medial frontal cortex. In contrast, in the skeletomotor
system the medial frontal cortex participates in reactive control.
There is a number of considerations and possible interpretations
of these findings.
First, it is possible that the reactive control signals exist in the
SEF, but were simply overlooked in past recording experiments.
That is always possible, but the fact that the negative finding in
SEF is based on results in four monkeys, while the positive finding
in pre-SMA/SMA is based on results in only two monkeys, makes
this possibility less likely.
Second, it is possible that this finding reflects a real differ-
ence in the structure and organization of behavioral control. The
number of cortical areas dedicated to the control of skeletomotor
movements and their relative size is much larger than the ones of
cortical areas dedicated to oculomotor control (e.g., Geyer et al.,
2000). This likely reflects the fact that the dynamics and kinematic
of skeletomotor movements are far more complex than saccadic
eye movements. Therefore, it might not be surprising, that pri-
mary motor regions, such as FEF and SC, are sufficient for the
reactive control of saccades, while in the case of skeletomotor
movements it is necessary to recruit or involve medial frontal
cortex as well.
Finally, one should keep in mind that the investigation and
comparison of the oculo- and skeletomotor system is still incom-
plete. Mirabella et al. (2011) tested dorsal premotor cortex (PMd)
using a variant stop signal task where the monkeys responded to
visual targets by touch with a speeded reaching movement. The
study found that among neurons with a movement-preparatory
activity, about one-third exhibit a modulation before the behav-
ioral estimate of the time it takes to cancel a planned movement.
Hence these neurons exhibit a pattern of activity suggesting that
PMd plays a critical role in the control of arm movement ini-
tiation and suppression. Some PMd neurons in the study were
specifically active, when the monkeys were cancelling the arm
movement. This is an intriguing finding, but a number of tech-
nical difficulties, such as the absence of EMG recordings limit the
interpretation of neural activity as clear evidence of reactive con-
trol signals. Furthermore, there is currently no single-unit study
of M1 using the stop signal task.
The location of the final decision as to whether or not a
planned arm movement is carried out is, therefore, still not
known. One possibility is that it takes place in the premotor
or in the primary motor cortex (M1). A recent countermand-
ing study in humans found that in M1, corticomotor excitability
was reduced and intracortical inhibition was significantly greater
on Stop trials compared with No stop signal trials at a time
that preceded the onset of muscle activity (Coxon et al., 2006).
These results indicate that inhibitory networks within M1 might
contribute to volitional inhibition of prepared action. Another
possible location for the final decision could be the basal gan-
glia (Mink, 1996). The internal segment of the globus pallidus
(GPi) inhibits thalamic and cortical neurons, and thus serves
as a block on the initiation of any action. The direct pathway
through the striatum releases an action by inhibiting a specific
set of GPi neurons. Both the hyperdirect pathway through the
STN and the indirect pathway from the striatum through the
external segment of the globus pallidus suppress actions by more
wide-spread excitation of GPi (Mink, 1996; Nambu, 2004). A
recent human neuroimaging study provided evidence for a role of
the STN and the hyperdirect pathway in countermanding (Aron
and Poldrack, 2006). Furthermore, deep brain stimulation of
STN affects response inhibition in Parkinson’s patients (Mirabella
et al., 2012).
THE STOP SIGNAL TASK: PROACTIVE CONTROL
Proactive control adjusts the response selection and preparation
process in anticipation of known task demands. Proactive control
is guided by endogenous signals, instead of external triggers, and
is constantly present throughout response selection and prepara-
tion. It can reflect a variety of factors such as the incentives for
choosing different responses, and the frequency of task-relevant
events. In the context of the stop signal task, proactive control
is mostly related to a regulation of the level of excitability of the
motor system. By adjusting the level of excitation and inhibi-
tion of the motor system, the proactive control system sets the
threshold for initiating a response. In making these adjustments
the proactive system has to negotiate the tradeoff between speed
(reaction time) and accuracy (cancelation likelihood) (Bogacz
et al., 2010).
Task performance in the stop signal task is clearly influenced by
factors that are independent of the presence of an actual stop sig-
nal (Verbruggen and Logan, 2009). Behavioral studies inmonkeys
and humans show that the mean response time during no stop
signal trials is delayed relative to a situation when no stop sig-
nal is expected (Verbruggen et al., 2004; Stuphorn and Schall,
2006; Verbruggen et al., 2006). Short-term changes in stop sig-
nal frequency lead to behavioral adjustments (Emeric et al., 2007;
Mirabella et al., 2008; Chen et al., 2010; Nelson et al., 2010). These
systematic modulations in the mean reaction time indicate the
presence of proactive control.
While the experimental evidence in favor of a role of the
medial frontal cortex in reactive control was mixed, there is very
clear evidence for such a role in the case of proactive control.
Very few neurons carried signals sufficient for saccade initiation
(Stuphorn et al., 2010). However, there exists a more subtle rela-
tionship between SEF activation and saccade production. The
activity of some SEF neurons was correlated with response time
and varied with sequential adjustments in response latency. Trials
in which monkeys inhibited or produced a saccade in a stop
signal trial were distinguished by a modest difference in dis-
charge rate of these SEF neurons before stop signal or target
presentation. Parallel results were observed in the SMA (Chen
et al., 2010). Furthermore, the analysis of LFP in the SMA
showed that longer response times following stop signal trials
(Figure 3A) were accompanied by an increased power in the very
low-frequency (1–20Hz) and the beta band (25–40Hz) start-
ing approximately 120ms before target onset (Figure 3B). These
findings indicate that neurons in the SEF and pre-SMA/SMA,
in contrast to FEF/SC movement and fixation cells, do not con-
tribute directly and immediately to the initiation of visually
guided saccades. However the SEF, pre-SMA, and SMA may
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FIGURE 3 | Changes in LFP power predict arm movement inhibition.
Effects of trial history on response time. (A) Response times for
no-stop-signal and stop trials surrounding noncanceled trials (left),
trials surrounding canceled trials (middle), and trials surrounding
corrected trials (right). The type of trials to which the response time
corresponds to is shown in bold (G: no stop signal; E: noncanceled;
Ca: canceled; Co: corrected). The dotted line indicates the average
response time on no-stop-signal trials. (B) Effects of trial history on
LFP power in the SMA. Comparison was performed between three
groups of no-stop-signal trials: those that followed another canceled trial
(Ca-Go), those that followed a noncanceled error trial (E-Go), and those
that followed a go trial (Go-Go). The time-frequency maps are aligned on
target onset. The significant differences between them are shown in
the right panel.
proactively regulate movement initiation by adjusting the level
of excitation and inhibition of the occulomotor and skeletomo-
tor systems based on prior performance and anticipated task
requirements.
REGULATION OF SPEED-ACCURACY TRADEOFF BY MEDIAL
FRONTAL CORTEX
In terms of computational reaction time models, a change in the
responsiveness of the motor system translates into a shift of the
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distance to the threshold at which a response is initiated (Ratcliff,
1978; Luce, 1986; Reddi and Carpenter, 2000). A decrease of the
threshold is equivalent to an increase of the baseline, and vice
versa (Stuphorn and Schall, 2002; Bogacz et al., 2010). Such shifts
can explain speed-accuracy tradeoffs (Uchida et al., 2006). The
results of neurophysiological experiments fit such reaction time
models very well. The firing rate of neurons in the oculomotor
(Hanes and Schall, 1996) and skeletomotor system (Lecas et al.,
1986) indeed exceeds a fixed threshold, when movements are ini-
tiated. There is also some evidence for changes in baseline activity
in the oculomotor system. In the superior colliculus, neurons with
visual and saccade-related activity increase their baseline firing
rate with increasing probability that a saccade in their motor field
is required (Basso and Wurtz, 1998; Dorris and Munoz, 1998) or
is more rewarding (Isoda and Hikosaka, 2008a,b).
We propose here that the dorsomedial frontal cortex, including
the SMA, is the source of the proactive control signal that modu-
lates the baseline motor activity. This hypothesis is supported by
the fact that activity levels in and around the pre-SMA increased
when response speed is emphasized during speed-accuracy trade-
off experiments (Forstmann et al., 2008; Ivanoff et al., 2008; van
Veen et al., 2008).
The hypothesis that movement-related neurons in SEF, pre-
SMA, and SMA influence reaction time by controlling excitability
in the oculomotor and skeletomotor system, respectively, might
be seen as contradicting the finding that these same neurons
do not carry signals sufficient to control movement initiation
(Scangos and Stuphorn, 2010; Stuphorn et al., 2010). However,
this is not the case. We propose that SMA activity determines
the response threshold, i.e., the amount of rise in motor activ-
ity that is necessary to initiate a movement. While the distance
to the threshold clearly influences the average time at which it is
exceeded, it is not sufficient to fully determine whether and when
the threshold is actually exceeded. We propose that this process
takes place in M1 and FEF, while SMA and SEF modulates this
process by setting the urgency with which a movement is chosen
and executed.
MOTIVATION FOR SPECIFIC ACTIONS AND ITS
RELATIONSHIP TO PROACTIVE CONTROL
While our findings make it unlikely that pre-SMA and SMA play
a causal role in initiating movements, lesions in these areas do
have a profound influence on behavior. We found that the activ-
ity of most movement-related neurons in SMA and SEF was
very strongly influenced by the reward contingency of the action
(Scangos and Stuphorn, 2010; So and Stuphorn, 2010). Thus, SEF,
pre-SMA, and SMA might represent the urge to act in a specific
way rather than the commitment to do so. According to this inter-
pretation the neurons in themedial frontal cortex represent amap
of action values.
This interpretation of medial frontal cortex activity as a moti-
vation signal fits with a large number of lesion and recording
studies in humans and monkeys that indicate that the medial
frontal cortex, in particularly pre-SMA, is responsible for self-
generated, voluntary actions (Papa et al., 1991; Romo and Schultz,
1992; Deiber et al., 1999), and reflects the reward obtained by
these actions (Stuphorn et al., 2000; Ito et al., 2003; Roesch and
Olson, 2003, 2004; Campos et al., 2005; Sohn and Lee, 2007).
Voluntary behavior is characterized by the motivation to act in
order to obtain a particular goal. Lesions of the pre-SMA and
SMA may lead to apathy, because the motivational drive that
normally links reward expectation with specific actions is absent.
However, since the motor system is still functional, external stim-
uli may still trigger automatic or habitual movements. This is, in
fact, what is observed for SMA lesions in monkeys (Thaler et al.,
1988, 1995) and humans (Levy and Dubois, 2006; Schmidt et al.,
2008).
There exists a close relationship between this interpretation
of medial frontal cortex activity as a motivational signal to the
earlier discussed interpretation that the activity might represent
proactive control signals. From an motivational point of view,
there are two mutually exclusive motivations that compete with
each other in the stop signal task. First, there is a motivation
to GO resulting from the very frequent link between movement
exceution and reward delivery. Secondly, there is a motivation to
WAIT (not to stop per se) generated by the awareness that on any
given trial a stop signal might be given. These two motivations
(or action values for GO and WAIT) vary in strength according
to the most recent reward and trial history. The relative strength
of these motivations determines the level of excitability and the
momentary speed-accuracy tradeoff of the subject at anymoment
in the task. However, this changing modulation of the level of
excitability of the motor system was exactly what was discussed
as a proactive control system earlier.
Our behavioral data showed strong sequential effects of errors
and successful cancelations on the reaction time of arm move-
ments in the stop signal task. Errors or an increased frequency
of stop signal trials lead to longer reaction times on subsequent
trials. Fewer stop signal trials lead to shorter reaction times. The
reaction time reflects the level of responsiveness in the motor sys-
tem. A less excitable state leads to longer reaction times, while a
more excitable state leads to shorter reaction times. The sequen-
tial effects show that the state of responsiveness of the motor
system is constantly adjusted by control signals that reset the
balance of excitation and inhibition within the motor system.
We observe motivational signals in SEF, pre-SMA, and
SMA during movement generation. In contrast, activity in the
orbitofrontal cortex appears earlier, immediately after a cue indi-
cating potential reward is revealed (Tremblay and Schultz, 1999;
Roesch and Olson, 2003, 2004; Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006),
but it does not encode the action necessary to obtain the reward
(Wallis and Miller, 2003; Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006).
Lateral prefrontal cortex activity reflects reward size and prefer-
ence in the delay period before a response is made (Kobayashi
et al., 2006; Sakagami andWatanabe, 2007). Striatal activity arises
after a cue is presented and remains high until reward is delivered
(Hikosaka et al., 1989; Hollerman et al., 1998). Thus, early reward
related signals from other brain areas might feed into the SMA
and pre-SMA where they are transformed into incentive signals
for specific actions (So and Stuphorn, 2010).
COMPARISON OF HUMAN ANDMONKEY DATA
Taken as a whole, electrophysiological data from humans and
monkeys during stopping point to comparable proactive and
Frontiers in Neuroengineering www.frontiersin.org June 2012 | Volume 5 | Article 9 | 7
Stuphorn and Emeric Proactive and reactive control by MFC
reactive control mechanisms. The preSMA and STN become
more active when a prepotent response must be reactively inhib-
ited (Isoda and Hikosaka, 2007, 2008a,b), while the preSMA and
SMA activity is correlated with subsequent proactive changes in
response time (Chen et al., 2010; Stuphorn et al., 2010). These
findings fit well with the results of human studies (Aron and
Poldrack, 2006; Sharp et al., 2010).
In addition, Aron and Poldrack (2006) have used human imag-
ing results to emphasize the role of the right IFC and the STN in
response inhibition during a manual stop signal task. Area 45, the
cortex anterior to the inferior spur of the arcuate sulcus and lateral
to the principal sulcus, is the most likely monkey homolog of the
rIFG (Petrides and Pandya, 1999). Unfortunately, only very few
electrophysiological recording studies in monkeys have examined
neurons in area 45 in tasks requiring inhibition. These studies
have used a go/nogo task and have reported neurons in BA45
that responded to behaviorally relevant cues and identified them
as nogo signals (Sakagami et al., 2001). However, no activity was
reported during the time period when the response to the target
needed to be suppressed. Clearly, neurophysiological studies in
monkeys are necessary to validate the role of IFC in stopping.
Aron et al. (2007a) used diffusion-weighted imaging tractog-
raphy to show that the IFC and the STN region are connected
via a white matter tract, which could underlie a hyperdi-
rect pathway for basal ganglia control. Although, the cor-
ticocortical and thalamocortical connections of area 45 have
been identified in the monkey (Contini et al., 2010; Gerbella
et al., 2010), there have been no anatomical studies describ-
ing a hyperdirect projection from area 45 to the STN (e.g.,
Monakow et al., 1978). The existence of a hyperdirect con-
nection between IFC/area 45 and STN is critical for the role
of ICF in reactive stopping (Aron, 2011). It is therefore, of
great priority to verify the existence of such a projection in
monkeys.
CONCLUSION
Converging evidence from human imaging and monkey electro-
physiology during stopping point to comparable proactive and
reactive control mechanisms. However the exact function al role
of IFC, basal ganglia, and thalamus in stopping is still unclear
and will require further investigations using neurophysiological
in awake behaving monkeys.
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